In the light of the LibDem policy on revoking article 50 (the abreaction to which I discuss here) YouGov asked people the following question:
“If a party stood on a manifesto of staying in the EU and won a majority in a general election, do you think it would or would not be legitimate for them to keep Britain in the EU?”
41% said that it would be legitimate.
38% said that it would not be legitimate.
This is remarkable.
Note – the question was not whether you support the policy, but whether it would be legitimate or not.
Legitimacy is a higher test than mere liking or disliking. You might dislike something, but to say it is illegitimate is a further step.
And yet 38% said it would be illegitimate.
Consider the same question with the specific content excised:
“If a party stood on a manifesto of X policy and won a majority in a general election, do you think it would or would not be legitimate for them to enact X policy?”
Out of context, most people would say it would always be legitimate, every single time.
What would the argument be that it was illegitimate in this case? Is it that only a referendum can overturn a previous referendum?
If so, are those Leave voters (see above) who responded 66% to 17% that it would be illegitimate now in favour of a confirmatory referendum?
If so, are they going to support one before a general election?
If not, then they can hardly blame the LibDems for using the next best thing to promote their position.
If they argue a general election must happen first, then what is the threshold of remain-supporting vote before a confirmatory referendum is required? And would it be by seat or by overall vote? So many questions.
The LibDems are smart. They’ve shifted the debate to where it should be: to the key questions of legitimacy of mandates, past and future, direct and indirect.
Under scrutiny, the existing mandate stinks. 2016 was not mandatory. It was not inclusive, fair, legal or compelling. It was as bent as a nine-ruble note.
It’s time to have that detailed conversation about mandates. Bring it on.
The LibDems, on a roll since the EU elections and with defecting MPs arriving almost weekly, have announced a new, eye-catching policy.
Their manifesto in the next election will include a promise to cancel Brexit. No ifs, no buts.
Arguably this is nothing new – what else could their EU campaign’s “Bollocks to Brexit” have meant?
But it has the merit of clarity. It says “We are the remain party.” Since as many as one in three voters recently thought the LibDems were still in favour of some sort of Brexit, this announcement surely obliterates that doubt.
So if it was both hardly new and somewhat necessary, why has it caused so much fuss?
Even Caroline Lucas has gone to press (or at least twitter) to complain that it is anti-democratic; that “you can’t turn the clock back” and “you can’t ignore the 17m who voted leave”. Lord Adonis has chimed in, “I strongly agree.”
You can’t ignore the 17m who voted leave. And we haven’t; the last three years have been all about leave, all day, every day.
THE POVERTY OF THE MANDATE
Nor, of course can you turn the clock back. But you can, and you should, ask whether the 2016 referendum was fair, legal, and compelling. It was none of those things. And even if it were, the concept of Brexit has changed; it now seems to mean only leaving without a deal, something derided three years ago as patently absurd. And so, too, has the world around us changed; the global picture of Trump, Putin and President Xi jockeying for position now makes the case for membership of a unified Europe so much stronger. The risks of Brexit in any form have been gradually, if only partially, revealed to us. The claims of its benefits have fallen away, such that now there is no longer any serious attempt to suggest economic positives, or even social ones; the offer now is just some nebulous sense of taking back control, even if that control paradoxically weakens us; even if we exert it, as one defiant Brexiter insisted, while we sit in the dark eating home-grown turnips.
BOXED-IN BORIS
Meanwhile, PM Johnson has boxed himself into a Do or Die (Br)exit strategy from which there is, ironically, no escape. He shows no signs of being able to do a deal; nor, at least until Parliament moved to block No Deal, has he shown signs of even wanting one. He promised to leave on 31 October (and owned that date as if he had set it himself) and all his credibility, such as it is, now depends on meeting that promise.
But how? The EU cannot move much without threatening its own existence; there is no time; the reasons for the backstop (now better understood by ordinary folk, especially those who grew up with the Troubles) have not fallen away. There are no “alternative arrangements” worth their salt, and if there were, there’d be no need for — and therefore no issue with — a backstop.
There is no way through this for Mr Johnson, just as there was no way through it for Mrs May. It can’t be done. It is an impossible goal, a circle which cannot be squared. It is a dead parrot. And yet it refuses to shuffle off its mortal coil. You’d feel sorry for Johnson, but he asked for the job, and reinforced the very walls which now close in on him. He shows no care or concern for the millions of lives thrown into chaos by his stance, nor for the constitutional mess he creates daily, nor the palpable threat to us all from the undermining of the rule of law. It’s his bed, but we all have to lie in it.
THE MOVING OF THE DIAL
In this context – the poverty of the Brexit mandate, and the impossibility of delivering it – it is past time for someone to stand up, clearly and unambiguously, for binning Brexit.
But the dial has been strikingly moved in recent months. It used to be a choice between Mrs May’s hard Brexit Withdrawal Agreement to possibly “no Brexit at all”. (And I have it on pretty good authority that, had she not been able to secure her first extension with the EU, she had decided to revoke.)
Now it has become a choice between an illusory harder Brexit deal (yet to be articulated, let alone struck) and “Brexit first, deal later” – which is what no deal really means. These repellent options have become the two ends of the possibility spectrum (the so-called “Overton Window”), and so blinkered has our politics become, that Jo Swinson and her excited supporters announcing a manifesto pledge to jettison Brexit entirely can be characterised as extremism, and undemocratic.
Our continued membership of the EU, which has brought peace and prosperity and freedoms for decades, is now an outlandish, harmful wish. Even offering it as a manifesto pledge, to be followed through only if a party wins a majority, is now judged anti-democratic. That is to say, an elected government, standing on a clear platform of continuity with the last four+ decades, delivering on its promises, could now be deemed anti-democratic. Not in the estimation of some swivel-eyed partisan, but in the estimation of sensible women like Caroline Lucas, and passionate remainers like Lord Adonis.
How we got here beggars belief. Politics has been amazing to watch. But in some ways this is the most shocking development. How easily our frame of reference has been shifted. How effectively the options have been narrowed by the repetition of specious arguments and demented catchphrases, a crude and self-interested press and a largely subservient broadcast media.
IF THIS IS THE POWER OF AN ADVISORY REFERENDUM…
Are the LibDems to be banned even from offering voters continuity with the last four decades, solely on the basis of the 2016 referendum?
If there were to be another referendum, for which Caroline Lucas has campaigned, would it be wrong to include a revoke option on the ballot? What would be the point of it, if it did not offer revoke?
Are we to say that only a referendum can counter a referendum? Not parliament, not MPs, not a new government elected with a majority of seats on a clear manifesto pledge? That would be an extraordinary adjudication. How long would such a situation obtain? If this is the power of an advisory referendum, thank heavens it wasn’t a legally binding one. It would have bound us, and our capacity for self-determination, in perpetuity.
Even if the 2016 referendum had been inclusive, fair, legal, and overwhelmingly decisive, future parliaments cannot surely be locked in by it. Future policy offerings cannot be vetoed by it. Our votes, in general elections as in referendums, still have to count for something; they cannot be invalidated by our previous votes, just because those previous votes were made in a referendum. (More on what might constitute legitimacy here.)
THE REAL SHOCK
You could argue that the LibDems tactic isn’t a good one; that it will lose them votes; that it will split the remain vote; or that it will cause them problems in the future. Fine. There is a valid debate about tactics to be had. You could just not like the policy, and refuse to support it. Fine.
But to contend that it is anti-democratic even to offer revoke to a future electorate is extraordinary. That statesmen and women of distinction and general clear-sightedness are holding such a view is a measure of how effectively our political horizons have been shaped and constrained by the Brexit ultras. This is the real shock. When good women and men turn against not just their own people, but against their own goals, the game is, in large and terrifying part, already lost.
Have you, like me, been wondering why everyone in Project Leave robotically calls the provisions in Theresa May’s Withdrawal Agreement the “anti-democratic” backstop?
Clearly this is a diktat from on high (ie Dominic Cummings). But is it just that they want to focus minds on what they see as an uncontroversial flaw in the WA, as reason for ditching it? Do they just want continually to trash the backstop so that the Withdrawal Agreement can never come back to life? And if they fail to make a new deal with the EU – assuming they even want one – are we all to say to ourselves, “Well, it’s not as if there was a chance, what with the EU’s insistence on that anti-democratic backstop”?
Or is that interpretation just unhelpful cynicism? Is there, instead, a real, principled objection here? Is the backstop indeed anti-democratic?
Appended below, is the full text of Boris Johnson’s letter to the EU on 19 August 2019.
To save you the read, here is the key part:
Firstly, there’s the much-discussed complaint that there would be “no sovereign means of exiting unilaterally.” If there is any faith in our sovereign state’s ability to come up with the so-called “alternative arrangements” at the border, then there would be no need for a backstop. This is tantamount to admitting failure is inevitable, and that the talk about alternative arrangements is disingenuous. [UPDATE 2 Oct 2019: Johnson now admits customs checks would be required, after all.]
What about the second, perhaps chewier point? The moral appeal here is to “the people of Northern Ireland” who sadly would have “no influence over the legislation which applies to them”.
“That,” he says, “is why the backstop is anti-democratic”.
Wow. So it’s all about looking after the people of Northern Ireland? Introducing a border where there was effectively none? Which nobody in their right mind wants? Which would likely provoke a return to the Troubles?
What’s so perplexing about this apparent concern for hapless citizens is that Brexit was rejected by the people of Northern Ireland. They voted 56% to Remain.
They didn’t want any of this in the first place.
Now, in their name, the backstop is branded anti-democratic.
Now, in their name, any putative deal with a backstop in it is automatically a betrayal.
Now, in their name, Johnson and his cabal seek to justify a UK-wide kamikaze crash-out.
In the name of people who voted against Brexit, we are heading towards No Deal.
There’s logic here, and principle. Just not as we know it.
Post Views:1,410
Dear Donald,
UNITED KINGDOM’S EXIT FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION
The date of the United Kingdom’s (UK) exit from the European Union (EU), 31 October, is fast approaching. I very much hope that we will be leaving with a deal. You have my personal commitment that this Government will work with energy and determination to achieve an agreement. That is our highest priority.
With that in mind, I wanted to set out our position on some key aspects of our approach, and in particular on the so-called “backstop” in the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland in the Withdrawal Agreement. Before I do so, let me make three wider points.
First, Ireland is the UK’s closest neighbour, with whom we will continue to share uniquely deep ties, a land border, the Common Travel Area, and much else besides. We remain, as we have always been, committed to working with Ireland on the peace process, and to furthering Northern Ireland’s security and prosperity. We recognise the unique challenges the outcome of the referendum poses for Ireland, and want to find solutions to the border which work for all.
Second, and flowing from the first, I want to re-emphasis the commitment of this Government to peace in Northern Ireland. The Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, as well as being an agreement between the UK and Ireland, is a historic agreement between two traditions in Northern Ireland, and we are unconditionally committed to the spirit and letter of our obligations under it in all circumstances – whether there is a deal with the EU or not.
Third, and for the avoidance of any doubt, the UK remains committed to maintaining the Common Travel Area, to upholding the rights of the people of Northern Ireland, to ongoing North-South cooperation, and to retaining the benefits of the Single Electricity Market.
The changes we seek relate primarily to the backstop. The problems with the backstop run much deeper than the simple political reality that it has three times been rejected by the House of Commons. The truth is that it is simply unviable, for these three reasons.
First, it is anti-democratic and inconsistent with the sovereignty of the UK as a state.
The backstop locks the UK, potentially indefinitely, into an international treaty which will bind us into a customs union and which applies large areas of single market legislation in Northern Ireland. It places a substantial regulatory border, rooted in that treaty, between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. The treaty provides no sovereign means of exiting unilaterally and affords the people of Northern Ireland no influence over the legislation which applies to them. That is why the backstop is anti-democratic.
Second, it is inconsistent with the UK’s desired final destination for a sustainable long-term relationship with the EU. When the UK leaves the EU and after any transition period, we will leave the single market and the customs union. Although we will remain committed to world-class environment, product and labour standards, the laws and regulations to deliver them will potentially diverge from those of the EU. That is the point of our exit and our ability to enable this is central to our future democracy.
The backstop is inconsistent with this ambition. By requiring continued membership of the customs union and applying many single market rules in Northern Ireland, it presents the whole of the UK with the choice of remaining in a customs union and aligned with those rules, or of seeing Northern Ireland gradually detached from the UK economy across a very broad ranges of areas. Both of those outcomes are unacceptable to the British Government.
Accordingly, as I said in Parliament on 25 July, we cannot continue to endorse the specific commitment, in paragraph 49 of the December 2017 Joint Report, to ‘full alignment’ with wide areas of the single market and the customs union. That cannot be the basis for the future relationship and it is not a basis for the sound governance of Northern Ireland.
Third, it has become increasingly clear that the backstop risks weakening the delicate balance embodied in the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. The historic compromise in Northern Ireland is based upon a carefully negotiated balance between both traditions in Northern Ireland, grounded in agreement, consent, and respect for minority rights. While I appreciate the laudable intentions with which the backstop was designed, by removing control of such large areas of the commercial and economic life of Northern Ireland to an external body over which the people of Northern Ireland have no democratic control, this balance risks being undermined.
The Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement neither depends upon nor requires a particular customs or regulatory regime. The broader commitments in the Agreement, including to parity of esteem, partnership, democracy and to peaceful means of resolving differences, can be be met if we explore solutions other than the backstop.
NEXT STEPS
For these three reasons the backstop cannot form part of an agreed Withdrawal Agreement. That is a fact we must both acknowledge. I believe the task before us is to strive to find other solutions, and I believe an agreement is possible.
We must, first, ensure there is no return to a hard border. One of the many dividends of peace in Northern Ireland and the vast reduction of the security threat is the disappearance of a visible border. This is something to be celebrated and preserved. This Government will not put in place infrastructure, checks, or controls at the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland. We would be happy to accept a legally binding commitment to this effect and hope that the EU would do likewise.
We must also respect the aim to find “flexible and creative” solutions to the unique circumstances on the island of Ireland. That means that alternative ways of managing the customs and regulatory differences contingent on Brexit must be explored. The reality is that there are already two separate legal, political, economic and monetary jurisdictions on the island of Ireland. This system is already administered without contention and with an open border.
The UK and the EU have already agreed that “alternative arrangements” can be part of the solution. Accordingly:
– I propose that the backstop should be replaced with a commitment to put in place such arrangements as far as possible before the end of the transition period, as part of the future relationship.
– I also recognise that there will need to be a degree of confidence about what would happen if these arrangements were not all fully in place at the end of that period. We are ready to look constructively and flexibly at what commitment might help, consistent of course with the principles set out in this letter.
Time is very short. But the UK is ready to move quickly, and given the degree of common ground already, I hope that the EU will be ready to do likewise. I am equally confident that our Parliament would be able to act rapidly if we were able to reach a satisfactory agreement which did not contain the “backstop”: indeed it has already demonstrated that there is a majority for an agreement on these lines.
I believe that a solution on the lines we are proposing will be more stable, more long lasting, and more consistent with the overarching framework of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement which has been decisive for peace in Northern Ireland. I hope that the EU can work energetically in this direction and for my part I am determined to do so.
I am copying this letter to the President of the European Commission and members of the European Council.
Yours ever,
Boris
Letter to European Council President, Donald Tusk, 19 August 2019
UK Parliament, 1st Day of Prorogation, 10 September, 2019
The Gormenghast and his Project Leave cabal are quite clearly adopting a strategy of chaos and iconoclasm.
Nothing you thought was safe is safe. It turns out that what you thought was a wall, solid and strong, protective, can easily be bulldozed.
Laws passed might not be enshrined, or obeyed; democracy might be shut down; people might be allowed to die for the sake of ideology; parties can be purged and smashed; treaties can be torn up and commitments reneged upon; we can talk trade while playing protectionism; we can talk science while crushing the cooperation it requires; we can cheat and be found out and still keep the keys to power; we can break the law and suppress investigation in the name of ‘national interest’; we can claim popular support for a single overriding issue, while refusing a confirmatory vote to prove it; we can insist on crashing the plane as a win….
Whatever else you call this policy of daily dead-cat-on-the-table outrage, it is not government.
It is the opposite of government.
It’s not just that the UK has no parliament. It has no government either.
